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Why Great Leaders Don't Take Yes for an Answer:
The Leadership Challenge
By
Michael A. Roberto
Part 3 of 4
Managing Reality
When Jack Welch took over as CEO of General Electric, he exhorted his managers
to "face reality...see the world the way it is, not the way you wish it were."
24
This advice certainly applies to the challenge of managing high-stakes
decision-making processes in complex and dynamic organizations. Leaders need to
understand how decisions actually unfold so that they can shape and influence
the process to their advantage. To cultivate conflict and build consensus
effectively, they must recognize that the decision process unfolds across
multiple levels of the organization, not simply in the executive suite. They
need to welcome divergent views, manage interpersonal disagreements, and build
commitment across those levels. Leaders also need to recognize that they cannot
remove politics completely from the decision process, somehow magically
transforming it into the purely intellectual exercise that they wish it would
become. As Joseph Bower wrote, "politics is not pathology; it is a fact of large
organization."
25 Effective leaders use political mechanisms to help them build
consensus among multiple constituencies. Moreover, leaders cannot ignore the
fact that managers often perform analyses to justify a preferred solution,
rather than proceeding sequentially from problem identification to alternative
evaluation to choice. Leaders must identify when such methods of persuasion
become dysfunctional, and then intervene appropriately to maintain the
legitimacy of the process, if they hope to build widespread commitment to a
chosen course of action. With this organizational reality in mind, let’s turn to
the first element of Cyrus the Great’s wise advice for decision makers: namely,
the challenge of cultivating constructive conflict.
The Absence of Dissent
How many of you have censored your views during a management meeting? Have you
offered a polite nod of approval as your boss or a respected colleague puts
forth a proposal, while privately harboring serious doubts? Have you immediately
begun to devise ways to alter or reverse the decision at a later date?
If you have answered "yes" to these questions, be comforted by the fact that you
are not alone. Many groups and organizations shy away from vigorous conflict and
debate. For starters, managers often feel uncomfortable expressing dissent in
the presence of a powerful, popular, and highly successful chief executive. It
becomes difficult to be candid when the boss’ presence dominates the room. We
also find ourselves deferring to the technical experts in many instances, rather
than challenging the pronouncements of company or industry veterans. Certain
deeply held assumptions about customers, markets, and competition can become so
in-grained in people’s thought processes that an entire industry finds itself
blindly accepting the prevailing conventional wisdom. Pressures for conformity
also arise because cohesive, relatively homogenous groups of like-minded people
have worked with one another for a long time.
26 Finally, some leaders engage in
conflict avoidance because they do not feel comfortable with confrontation in a
public setting. Whatever the reasons—and they are bountiful—the absence of
healthy debate and dissent frequently leads to faulty decisions. Let’s turn to a
tragic example to see this dynamic in action.
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Tragedy on Everest
In 1996, Rob Hall and Scott Fischer each led a commercial expedition team
attempting to climb Mount Everest. Each group consisted of the leader, several
guides, and eight paying clients. Although many team members reached the summit
on May 10, they encountered grave dangers during their descent. Five
individuals, including the two highly talented leaders, perished as they tried
to climb down the mountain during a stormy night.
Many survivors and mountaineering experts have pointed out that the two leaders
made a number of poor decisions during this tragedy. Perhaps most importantly,
the groups ignored a critical decision rule created to protect against the
dangers of descending after nightfall. Climbers typically begin their final push
to the summit from a camp located at an altitude of about 26,000 feet (7,900
meters). They climb through the night, hoping to reach the summit by midday.
Then, they scramble back down to camp, striving to reach the safety of their
tents before sunset. This tight 18-hour schedule leaves little room for error.
If climbers fall behind during the ascent, they face an extremely perilous
nighttime descent. Hall and Fischer recognized these dangers. Moreover, they
understood that individuals would find it difficult to abandon their summit
attempt after coming so tantalizingly close to achieving their goal. They knew
that climbers, as they near the summit, are particularly susceptible to the
"sunk-cost bias." Thus, they advocated strict adherence to a predetermined
decision rule. Fischer described it as the "two o’clock rule,"—i.e., when it
became clear that a climber could not reach the top by two o’clock in the
afternoon, that individual should abandon his summit bid and head back to the
safety of the camp. If he failed to do so, the leaders and/or the guides should
order the climbers to turn around. One team member recalled, "Rob had lectured
us repeatedly about the importance of having a predetermined turnaround time on
summit day...and abiding by it no matter how close we were to the top."
28
Unfortunately, the leaders, guides, and most clients ignored the turnaround rule
during the ascent. Nearly all the team members, including the two leaders,
arrived at the summit after two o’clock. As a result, many climbers found
themselves descending in darkness, well past midnight, as a ferocious blizzard
enveloped the mountain. Not only did five people die, many others barely escaped
with their lives.
Why did the climbers ignore the two o’clock rule? Many team members recognized
quite explicitly the perils associated with violating the turnaround rule, but
they chose not to question the leaders’ judgment. The groups never engaged in an
open and candid dialogue regarding the choice to push ahead. Neil Beidleman, a
guide on Fischer’s team, had serious reservations about climbing well past
midday. However, he did not feel comfortable telling Fischer that the group
should turn around. Perceptions of his relative status within the group affected
Beidleman’s behavior. He was "quite conscious of his place in the expedition
pecking order," and consequently, he chose not to voice his concerns.
29 He
reflected back, "I was definitely considered the third guide...so I tried not to
be too pushy. As a consequence, I didn’t always speak up when maybe I should
have, and now I kick myself for it."
30 Similarly, Jon Krakauer, a journalist
climbing as a member of Hall’s team, began to sense the emergence of a
"guide-client protocol" that shaped the climbers’ behavior. Krakauer remarked,
"On this expedition, he (Andy Harris—one of Rob Hall’s guides) had been cast in
the role of invincible guide, there to look after me and the other clients; we
had been specifically indoctrinated not to question our guides’ judgment."
31
The climbers on these expedition teams also did not know one another very well.
Many of them had not met their colleagues prior to arriving in Nepal. They found
it difficult to develop mutual respect and trust during their short time
together. Not knowing how others might react to their questions or comments,
many climbers remained hesitant when doubts surfaced in their minds. Russian
guide Anatoli Boukreev, who did not have a strong command of the English
language, found it especially difficult to build relationships with his
teammates. Consequently, he did not express his concerns about key aspects of
the leaders’ plans, for fear of how others might react to his opinions.
Regretfully, he later wrote, "I tried not to be too argumentative, choosing
instead to downplay my intuitions."
32
Hall also made it clear to his team during the early days of the expedition that
he would not welcome disagreement and debate during the ascent. He believed that
others should defer to him because of his vast mountain-climbing expertise and
remarkable track record of guiding clients to the summit of Everest. After all,
Hall had guided a total of 39 clients to the top during 4 prior expeditions. He
offered a stern pronouncement during the early days of the climb: "I will
tolerate no dissension up there. My word will be absolute law, beyond appeal."
33
Hall made the statement because he wanted to preempt pushback from clients who
might resist turning around if he instructed them to do so. Ironically, Hall
fell behind schedule on summit day and should have turned back, but the clients
did not challenge his decision to push ahead. Because of Hall’s early
declaration of authority, Krakauer concluded that, "Passivity on the part of the
clients had thus been encouraged throughout our expedition."
34
Before long, deference to the "experts" became a routine behavior for the team
members. When the experts began to violate their own procedures or make other
crucial mistakes, that pattern of deference persisted. Less-experienced team
members remained hesitant to raise questions or concerns. Fischer’s situation
proved especially tragic. His physical condition deteriorated badly during the
final summit push, and his difficulties became apparent to everyone including
the relative novices. He struggled to put one foot in front of the other, yet
"nobody discussed Fischer’s exhausted appearance" or suggested that he should
retreat down the slopes.
35
Unfortunately, the experience of these teams on the slopes of Everest mirrors
the group dynamic within many executive suites and corporate boardrooms in
businesses around the world. The factors suppressing debate and dissent within
these expedition teams also affect managers as they make business decisions.
People often find themselves standing in Neil Beidleman’s shoes—lower in status
than other decision makers and unsure of the consequences of challenging those
positioned on a higher rung in the organizational pecking order. Many leaders
boast of remarkable track records, like Rob Hall, and employ an autocratic
leadership style. Inexperienced individuals find themselves demonstrating
excessive deference to those with apparent expertise in the subject at hand.
Plenty of teams lack the atmosphere of mutual trust and respect that facilitates
and encourages candid dialogue. Fortunately, most business decisions are not a
matter of life or death.
36
The Perils of Conflict and Dissent
Of course, dissent does not always prove to be productive; cultivating conflict
has its risks. To understand the perils, we must distinguish between two forms
of conflict. Suppose that you ask your management team to compare and contrast
two alternative courses of action. Individuals may engage in substantive debate
over issues and ideas, which we refer to as cognitive, or task-oriented,
conflict. This form of disagreement exposes each proposal’s risks and
weaknesses, challenges the validity of key assumptions, and even might encourage
people to define the problem or opportunity confronting the firm in an entirely
different light. For these reasons, cognitive conflict tends to enhance the
quality of the solutions that groups produce. As former Intel CEO Andrew Grove
once wrote, "Debates are like the process through which a photographer sharpens
the contrast when developing a print. The clearer images that result permit
management to make a more informed—and more likely correct—call."
37
Unfortunately, when differences of opinion emerge during a discussion, managers
may find it difficult to reconcile divergent views. At times, people become
wedded to their ideas, and they begin to react defensively to criticism.
Deliberations become heated, emotions flare, and disagreements become personal.
Scholars refer to these types of personality clashes and personal friction as
affective conflict. When it surfaces, decision processes often derail.
Unfortunately, most leaders find it difficult to foster cognitive conflict
without also stimulating interpersonal friction. The inability to disentangle
the two forms of conflict has pernicious consequences. Affective conflict
diminishes commitment to the choices that are made, and it disrupts the
development of shared understanding. It also leads to costly delays in the
decision process, meaning that organizations fail to make timely decisions, and
they provide competitors with an opportunity to capture advantages in the
marketplace.
38 Figure 1-2 depicts how cognitive and affective conflict shape
decision-making outcomes.
39
Figure 1-2: Cognitive and affective conflict
Click on image to enlarge
Consider the case of a defense electronics firm examining how to restructure a
particular line of business. The chief executive wanted to take a hard look at
the unit because it had become unprofitable. Multiple options emerged, and
managers conducted a great deal of quantitative analysis to compare and contrast
each possible course of action. A lively set of deliberations ensued. The chief
financial officer played a particularly important role. He scrutinized all the
proposals closely, treating each with equal skepticism. One manager remarked
that, "He would be able to articulate the black and white logical reasons why
things made sense, or why they didn’t make sense...He was incredibly
objective...like Spock on Star Trek." Unfortunately, not everyone could remain
as objective. Some managers took criticism very personally during the
deliberations, and working relationships became strained. Discussions became
heated as individuals defended their proposals in which they had invested a
great deal of time and energy. Some differences of opinion centered on a
substantive issue; in other cases, people disagreed with one another simply
because they did not want others to "win" the dispute. As one executive
commented, "We could have put the legitimate roadblocks on the table, and
separated those from the emotional roadblocks. We would have been much better
off. But, we put them all in the same pot and had trouble sorting out which were
real and which weren’t." Ultimately, the organization made a decision regarding
how to restructure, and looking back, nearly everyone agreed that they had
discovered a creative and effective solution to the unit’s problems. However,
the organization struggled mightily to execute its chosen course of action in a
timely and efficient manner. The entire implementation effort suffered from a
lack of buy-in among people at various levels of the organization. Management
overcame these obstacles and, eventually, the business became much more
profitable. Nevertheless, the failure to develop a high level of consensus
during the decision process cost the organization precious time and resources.
Figure 1-3 depicts how conflict and consensus can come together to lead to
positive outcomes rather than poor choices and flawed implementation efforts.
Figure 1-3 The path to decision success
Click on image to enlarge
Why Is This So Difficult?
Why is managing conflict and building consensus so challenging? The roots of the
problem may reside in one’s style of leadership. Often, however, the difficulty
reflects persistent patterns of dysfunction within groups and organizations.
Let’s try to understand a few sources of difficulty that leaders must overcome
as they shape and direct decision processes.
Leadership Style
Leaders may have certain personal preferences and attributes that make it
difficult to cultivate constructive conflict and/or build consensus within their
organizations. For instance, some executives may be uncomfortable with
confrontation, and therefore, they tend to avoid vigorous debates at all costs.
They shy away from cognitive conflict because loud voices and sharp criticism
simply make them uneasy. Others may be highly introverted, and consequently,
they may discover that their employees find it difficult to discern their
intentions as well as the rationale that they have employed to make decisions.
Some executives prefer to manage by fear and intimidation, and they enjoy
imposing their will on organizations. That leadership style also squelches
dissenting voices, and it can leave employees feeling unenthusiastic about a
proposed plan of action that they did not help to formulate. Of course, a few
extraordinary leaders foster enormous levels of commitment while employing this
approach. Consider, for instance, the management style of Bill Parcells, the
famous professional football coach. He has dramatically turned around four very
unsuccessful franchises over the past two decades, and his teams have won two
world championships. He thrives on confrontation, instills a great deal of fear
in his players, and makes decisions in a highly autocratic fashion. Yet, players
put forth an incredible effort for Parcells, and they frequently express an
intense desire to please him, despite the fact that he makes their lives
difficult at times. In general, however, success often proves difficult to
sustain over the long haul for those who employ this leadership pattern. Perhaps
that explains why Parcells has chosen to shift frequently from one team to
another during his coaching career.
40
Cognitive Biases
A few mental traps also stand in the way as leaders try to manage conflict and
consensus. For instance, most individuals search for information in a biased
manner. They tend to downplay data that contradicts their existing views and
beliefs, while emphasizing the information that supports their original
conclusions. This confirmation bias explains why leaders may not aggressively
seek to surface dissenting views, or why they may not listen carefully to those
voices. Naturally, managers become frustrated if they perceive that leaders are
processing information in a biased manner, and that disappointment can diminish
buy-in.
41 Overconfidence bias becomes a factor in many situations as well. Most
of us tend to overestimate our own capabilities. Consequently, we may not
recognize when we need to solicit input and advice from others, or we downplay
the doubts that others display regarding our judgments and decisions.
42
Threat Rigidity
In many cases, strategic decision making occurs in the context of a threatening
situation—the organization must deal with poor financial performance,
deteriorating competitive position, and/or a dramatic shift in customer
requirements. When faced with a threatening context, the psychological stress
and anxiety may induce a rigid cognitive response on the part of individuals.
People tend to draw upon deeply ingrained mental models of the environment that
served them well in the past. Individuals also constrict their information
gathering efforts, and they revert to the comfort of well-learned practices and
routines. This cognitive rigidity impairs a leader’s ability to surface and
discuss a wide range of dissenting views. To make matters worse, factors at the
group and organizational level complement and reinforce this inflexible and
dysfunctional response to threatening problems. Consequently, organizational
decision processes become characterized by restricted information processing, a
constrained search for solutions, a reduction in the breadth of participants,
and increased reliance on formal communication procedures.
43
In-Groups Versus Out-Groups
As people work together throughout the decision process, they have a natural
tendency to categorize other members of the groups in which they interact. They
classify some people as similar to them (the in-group) and others as quite
different based on a few salient demographic characteristics or professional
attributes (the out-group). For instance, an engineer may distinguish those
group members with similar functional backgrounds from individuals who have
spent their careers working in finance or marketing. In general, people tend to
perceive in-group members in a positive light and out-group members in a
negative light. These perceptions shape the way that individuals interact with
one another. Highly divisive categorization processes—those circumstances in
which people draw sharp distinctions between in-groups and out-groups—can
diminish social interaction among group members, impede information flows, and
foster interpersonal tensions.
Individuals also appraise other group members in terms of personal attributes
such as intelligence, integrity, and conscientiousness. Unfortunately, a
person’s self-appraisal often does not match the view that others have. An
individual may see himself as highly trustworthy, whereas others have serious
doubts about whether he is reliable and dependable. When individuals tend to see
themselves in a manner consistent with others’ views and perceptions, groups
perform more effectively. If many perceptual disconnects exist within a group,
people find it difficult to interact constructively. It becomes difficult to
manage disputes and lead deliberations smoothly.
44
Organizational Defensive Routines
Organizations often develop mechanisms to bypass or minimize the embarrassment
or threat that individuals might experience. Managers employ these "defensive
routines" to preserve morale, make "bad news" a bit more palatable, and soften
the impact of negative feedback. They want people to remain upbeat and positive
about the organization’s mission as well as their own situation. For instance,
in many firms, we witness the existence of an implicit understanding of the need
to employ a routine for helping employees to "save face" when they have failed.
Unfortunately, such behaviors depress the level of candor within the
organization, and they make certain issues "undiscussable." Over time, these
defensive practices become deeply ingrained in the organizational culture. They
do not occur because a specific individual wants to avoid embarrassing a
colleague, but rather because all managers understand that this is "the way
things are done around here." Leaders often find it extremely difficult to
dismantle these deeply embedded barriers to open and honest dialogue.
45
A Deeper Explanation
All the factors described previously certainly make it difficult to manage
conflict and consensus effectively. The core contention of this book, however,
is that many leaders fail to make and implement decisions successfully for a
more fundamental reason—that is, they tend to focus first and foremost on
finding the "right" solution when a problem arises, rather than stepping back to
determine the "right" process that should be employed to make the decision. They
fixate on the question, "What decision should I make?" rather than asking "How
should I go about making the decision?" Answering this "how" question correctly
often has a profound impact on a leader’s decision-making effectiveness. It
enables leaders to create the conditions and mechanisms that will lead to
healthy debate and dissent as well as a comprehensive and enduring consensus.
Naturally, leaders also must address the content of critical high-stakes
decisions, not simply the processes of deliberation and analysis. They have to
take a stand on the issues, and they must make difficult trade-offs in many
cases. Moreover, creating and leading an effective decision-making process does
not guarantee a successful choice and smooth implementation. However, developing
and managing a high-quality decision-making process does greatly enhance the
probability of successful choices and results.
46
Throughout this book, I argue that leaders should stay attuned constantly to the
social, emotional, and political processes of decision. However, they need to do
more than this. They must not simply react passively to the personality clashes
and backroom maneuvering that emerges during a decision-making process. Instead,
they should actively shape and influence the conditions under which people will
interact and deliberate. They must make choices about the type of process that
they want to employ and the roles that they want various people to play. In
short, leaders must "decide how to decide" as they confront complex and
ambiguous situations, rather than fixating solely on the intellectual challenge
of finding the optimal solution to the organization’s perplexing problems. With
this broad theme in mind, let’s begin to tackle the marvelous challenge of
discovering how leaders can cultivate "diversity in counsel, unity in command."
©2006 Pearson Education
